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A Summary
Service plans are a type of warranty contract under
which retailers promise to repair or replace products
for consumers. Separate from manufacturers'
warranty policies, which typically come bundled
with the products, and also known as service
contracts, protection plans, or retailer extended
warranties, retailers' service plans are optional and
usually offer broader and more prolonged coverage
than those offered by manufacturers' base warranties.
Today, these plans are available for almost all durable
goods in retail stores, and so pervasive that it is rare
to find a major retailer in the U.S. that does not
provide them. In fact, it has become the norm that,
when purchasing a product, consumers are faced with
warranties offered by multiple parties, typically the
manufacturer base warranty that is bundled with the
product and an optional retail service plan.
It is well documented that manufacturers use
warranties to protect consumers against product
failure and to signal product quality. In this paper, we
argue that these roles of the manufacturer's warranty
can be affected by the offering of retail service plans.
From the consumer's point of view, the retailer's
service plan complements and can even substitute for
the manufacturer's base warranty. Given that the
retailer has already offered a more extended warranty,
it seems obvious that the manufacturer should offer a
minimal warranty so as to avoid free-riding on the
part of the retailer. So why does manufacturer still
offer a base warranty? More generally, what
motivates manufacturers to offer a base warranty
when service plans are available to consumers? What
are the strategic interactions between the retail
service plan and the manufacturer base warranty?
How do these service plans affect the role of
manufacturers' warranties and channel performance?
Regardless of the prevalence of service plans in

the retail sector, studies on these plans and their
interactions with manufacturers' warranties are scarce.
The present research strives to contribute to a better
understanding of the role of the retail service plan in
distribution channels in which the manufacturer also
offers a (base) warranty. Our investigation starts with
a context in which consumers are able to assess
product quality--in this research, high quality refers
to a high degree of reliability in product performance
(or a low risk of product failure). It then addresses
the more interesting scenario of consumers being
unable to assess that quality. It is well accepted that
when quality is unobservable to consumers, a high
quality manufacturer has the incentive to use a
warranty to signal quality (Spence 1977). Our
research therefore specifically investigates the role of
a retailer's service plan in the manufacturer's
signaling strategy. To concentrate on the signaling
issues involved in warranty strategy, we abstract
from the consumer moral hazard problem by
assuming that consumer action does not affect the
quality or reliability of products. Consequently, the
results of our analysis are most applicable to products
that require little consumer maintenance and present
little opportunity for consumer moral hazard.
We consider a market in which a manufacturer
markets a product through a retailer to a group of
consumers. The product is subject to a certain
probability of failure. The consumers are
heterogeneous in their willingness to pay to avoid the
incidence of product failure. In a model with
complete information, we assume that the quality of
the product is known by all parties in the market. The
manufacturer determines whether to bundle the
product with a base warranty, and sets a wholesale
price accordingly. Based on the manufacturer's
decisions, the retailer then sets a retail price for the
product and a price for an optional service plan, if it
is offered. Consumers then determine whether to
purchase the product and the service plan. In such a
context, offering an optional service plan can help
the retailer to promote product demand, and segment
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and better serve heterogeneous consumers. We show
that when the retailer offers a service plan, the
manufacturer offers its warranty only if it is more
cost efficient than the retailer in providing a
warranty.
We then develop models with incomplete
information where the probabilistic product failure
rate, either high or low, is determined by nature and
known only to the manufacturer and the retailer, not
known to the consumers. In such cases, a high
quality manufacturer will have the incentive to signal
its quality. Intuition suggests that in the presence of a
more extended retail service plan, a high quality
manufacturer should reduce its warranty coverage to
avoid free-riding on the part of the retailer (Lutz and
Padmanabhan 1995). In addition, because consumers
who are very concerned about product quality can
opt for a service plan to obtain peace of mind, it
appears that the presence of such a service plan
should also reduce consumers' need for a signal from
the manufacturer, thus reducing that manufacturer's
incentive to signal. Indeed, we find that the presence
of a service plan can nullify the effects of a
manufacturer's offering of a (longer or greater) base
warranty as a signaling strategy, i.e., the availability
of service plans can diminish the positive
relationship between warranty and quality, as
suggested by the signaling rationale of warranty.
However, we also find that, in the presence of a
service plan, a high quality manufacturer may have
greater incentive to signal and offer greater warranty
coverage in the signaling equilibrium. It is even
possible that the greater the coverage of the service
plan, the greater the incentive the manufacturer has
to signal and the greater base warranty coverage it
offers. These unexpected results highlight two
opposing effects of a service plan on a manufacturer's
incentive to signal quality by offering a warranty.
Because, from the consumer's point of view, a service
plan can substitute for the manufacturer's warranty,
the availability of such a plan makes the presence of
a manufacturer warranty less attractive. This
mitigates the manufacturer's motivation to use a
warranty to signal quality. At the same time, however,
because a service plan can promote demand for a
product, it can also enhance the manufacturer's
motivation for such signaling. Therefore, when
consumers are unable to access product quality, the
impact of a service plan on the manufacturer's
warranty strategy depends on these two opposing
effects.
The presence of a service plan also affects the
profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer. We
find that whether or not consumers are able to assess
product quality, offering a service plan always
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increases profits for the retailer, but not necessarily
for the manufacturer. The retailer cannot be rendered
worse off by the acquisition of an additional
marketing instrument, whereas the manufacturer will
be better off only if the retailer's cost for providing
the service plan is low enough.

Literature Review
There is a rich body of literature on product
warranties. The insurance role of warranties was
understood fairly early on and documented by Heal
(1977). In this view, warranties provide insurance
against product failure to risk-averse consumers.
Because consumers have heterogeneous preferences
for warranty coverage, the literature also shows that a
seller can use a menu of warranty coverage to screen
(i.e., to segment) consumers (Mussa and Rosen 1978).
For instance, an optimal policy may consist of two
warranty options, with a base warranty being offered
to less risk-averse consumers and an extended
warranty to more risk-averse consumers. When
consumers' actions are unobservable but affect
product liability, it has been shown that the consumer
moral hazard problem can affect a firm's warranty
strategy for screening (Padmanabhan and Rao 1993).
Spence (1977) initiated a new branch of
research on the signaling role of warranty. In markets
in which product quality is not readily observable to
consumers, a high quality manufacturer can use a
better or longer warranty to signal its quality if it is
too costly for a low quality manufacturer to offer the
same coverage. Soberman (2003) considers a
situation in which a seller uses a warranty both to
screen and to signal, and shows that signaling can
limit the seller's ability to screen because, to signal, it
generally lengthens the base warranty and shortens
the optional extended warranty. Lutz (1989)
examines the use of prices and warranties as signals
of product quality under consumer moral hazard and
shows that, surprisingly, quality can be signaled with
a low-coverage warranty. Although firms should take
the consumer moral hazard problem into account
when making warranty policy for certain products,
we focus on other products that present little
opportunity for the problem to highlight the signaling
role played by the manufacturer's warranty.
Provided that high quality products are less
expensive to guarantee than low-quality products, it
seems intuitively reasonable that an observable
warranty could serve as a signal of unobservable
product quality. It has been verified that a warranty
can influence consumers' risk perceptions (Bearden
and Shimp 1982). However, although some
researchers have evidenced better and longer
warranties as signals of high product quality (Wiener
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1985, Kelley 1988, Boulding and Kirmani 1993),
others have found lower quality products to offer
longer warranties (Bryant and Gerner 1978, Gerner
and Bryant 1981). A number of models have been
proposed to address this inconsistency. Gal-Or (1989)
showed that oligopolistic competition in a product
market could affect firms' incentives, such that higher
quality would be signalled by a lower warranty
coverage. Balachander (2001) shows that a less
reliable product may carry a longer warranty in a
product market in which a new entrant competes with
an established product. More researchers have argued
that in the presence of consumer moral hazard,
high-quality firms may optimally choose to offer less
warranty coverage than low-quality ones because a
strong warranty results in a low degree of
maintenance effort on the part of consumers (Cooper
and Ross 1985, Lutz 1989, Dybvig and Lutz 1993).
Our results contribute to this stream of research by
offering an alternative explanation for the weak
relationship between quality and warranty: the
presence of retailer service plans can diminish the
correlation between them.
The role of warranty has also been studied in the
context of the supply chain, with a focus on channel
coordination. Desai and Padmanabhan (2004) show
that a manufacturer can use its warranty to coordinate
a bilateral-monopoly distribution channel. In their
model, the manufacturer warranty can be offered
through three channel arrangements, direct (i.e.,
selling though the manufacturer itself), indirect (i.e.,
selling through a retailer) and dual distribution (i.e.,
selling through a combination of the aforementioned
two). They find that the ability of a manufacturer to
market a complementary good (i.e., a warranty) that
helps to combat the price coordination problem in a
channel alleviates its need to consider forward
integration as a means of combating double
marginalization. In an unpublished paper, Li et al.
(2008) examine the role of warranty in a
bilateral-monopoly distribution framework, but they
assume that the warranty is offered by either the
manufacturer or the retailer (but not by both). With
reduced-form demand functions, they show that
when the warranty is offered by the retailer, it has
longer coverage and the system profit is greater.
In all of the aforementioned, the warranty
option(s) is assumed to be offered by one firm only.
To the best of our knowledge, only two studies are
exceptional in this regard, those carried out by Lutz
and Padmanabhan (1995, 1998).
In the context of consumer moral hazard, Lutz
and Padmanabhan (1995) provide an explanation for
the minimal manufacturer base warranties observed
in certain markets. They show that the provision of

an extended warranty by an independent insurer and
the presence of consumer moral hazard create a
negative cost externality on the manufacturer's
warranty. To avoid the insurer free-riding on its own
warranty, the manufacturer bundles its product with a
minimal base warranty. Under conditions of producer
moral hazard, these researchers (Lutz and
Padmanabhan 1998) also focus on a manufacturer's
ability to use a menu of warranties to segment
consumers. They show that the availability of
extended warranties from an independent insurer has
an important effect on a menu of warranties to screen,
and that the entry of the insurer can, surprisingly,
increase the manufacturer's profits.
The present research is among the few
theoretical studies to explicitly model the interactions
between warranties offered by different firms.
Moreover, it is the first study on warranty in a
distribution channel context in which both the upand down-stream parties offer a warranty, and it is
the first attempt to examine the interactions between
warranties from a signaling perspective. We offer a
number of insights that have not been addressed in
the previous literature.

Concluding Remarks
Service plans are a type of optional warranty beyond
the manufacturer's base warranty that retailers offer
to consumers. Regardless of their prevalence and
nontrivial implications in distribution channels,
research on service plans is scarce. In this paper, we
examine the impacts of a retailer's service plan on a
manufacturer's base warranty policy and on channel
performance. Analysis shows that when consumers
can assess product quality, in the presence of a
service plan, a manufacturer should not offer a base
warranty unless it is more cost efficient than the
retailer in providing that warranty. When consumers
cannot assess product quality, a high quality
manufacturer is motivated to use its own warranty to
signal that quality. In such cases, we find that, in the
presence of a service plan, the manufacturer's base
warranty serves as a credible signal only when the
manufacturer is less cost efficient. The service plan
can render the manufacturer's signaling either more
or less viable, and result in either greater or lesser
warranty coverage in the signaling equilibrium.
Whether or not consumers can assess product quality,
offering a service plan always increases profits for
the retailer and the channel as a whole, but not
necessarily for the manufacturer.

References
[1]

Balachander, S. 2001. Warranty signaling an
d reputation. Management Sci. 47(9) 1282-1
289.

The 9th International Conference on Electronic Business, Macau, November 30 - December 4, 2009

How Does A Retailer's Service Plan Affect A Manufacturer's Warranty
[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]
[10]

[11]
[12]

[13]

Bearden, W., T. Shimp. 1982. The use of
extrinsic cues to facilitate product adoption.
J. Marketing Res. 19(2) 229-239.
Boulding, W., A. Kirmani. 1993. A consum
er-side experimental examination of signalin
g theory: do consumers perceive warranties
as signals of quality? J. Consumer Res. 2
0(1) 111-123.
Bryant, W. K., J. Gerner. 1978. The price
of a warranty: The case for refrigerators. J.
Consumer Affairs 12 30-47.
Bryant, W. K., J. Gerner. 1982. The deman
d for service contracts. J. Business 55(3) 3
45-366.
Cooper, R., T. W. Ross. 1985. Product warr
anties and double moral hazard. Rand J. E
conom. 16(1) 103-113.
Desai, P. S., V. Padmanabhan. 2004. Durab
le good, extended warranty and channel co
ordination. Rev. Marketing Sci. 2 1-23.
Dybvig, P. H., N. A. Lutz. 1993. Warrantie
s, durability and maintenance: two-sided mo
ral hazard in a continuous-time model. Rev.
Econom. Stud. 60(3) 575-97.
Gal-Or, E. 1989. Warranties as a signal of
quality. Canadian J. Econom. 22(1) 50-61.
Gerner, J. L., W. K. Bryant. 1981. Applian
ce warranties as a market signal? J. Consu
mer Affairs. 15(1) 75-86.
Heal, G. 1977. Guarantees and risk-sharing.
Rev. Econom. Stud. 44(3) 549-560.
Kelley, C. A. 1988. An investigation of co
nsumer product warranties as market signals
of product reliability. J. Academy Marketin
g Sci. 16(2) 72-78.
Li, K., D. Chhajed, S. Mallik. 2008. Desig
n of extended warranties in supply chains.

[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]
[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]

93

Working Paper, University of Illinois, Urba
na-Champaign.
Lutz, N. A. 1989. Warranties as signals un
der consumer moral hazard. Rand J. Econo
m. 20(2) 239-255.
Lutz, N. A., V. Padmanabhan. 1995. Why
do we observe minimal warranties? Marketi
ng Sci. 14(4) 417-441.
Lutz, N. A., V. Padmanabhan. 1998. Warra
nties, extended warranties, and product qual
ity. Internat. J. Industrial Organization 16(4)
463-493.
Maronick, J. T. 2007. Consumer perceptions
of extended warranties. J. Retailing and C
onsumer Services 14 224--231.
Moorthy, K. S., K. Srinivasan. 1995. Signal
ing quality with a money-back guarantee: T
he role of transaction costs. Marketing Sci.
14(4) 442-466.
Mussa M., S. Rosen. 1978. Monopoly and
product quality. J. Econom. Theory 18(2) 3
01-17.
Nelson, P. 1974. Advertising as information.
J. Political Econom. 81(4) 729-754.
Padmanabhan, V., R. C. Rao. 1993. Warran
ty policy and extended service contracts: T
heory and an application to automobiles. M
arketing Sci. 12(3) 230-247.
Soberman, D. A. 2003. Simultaneous signal
ing and screening with warranties. J. Marke
ting Res. 40(2) 176-192.
Spence, A. M. 1977. Consumer mispercepti
ons, product failure and producer liability.
Rev. Econom. Stud. 44(3) 561-572.
Wiener, J. L. 1985. Are warranties accurate
signals of product reliability? J. Consumer
Res. 12(2) 245-250.

The 9th International Conference on Electronic Business, Macau, November 30 - December 4, 2009

